

JX
1425
A2

UC-NRLF



\$B 20 280

06553



Brazil and the Monroe Doctrine

BY

DUNSHEE DE ABRANCHES

Member of the Brazilian National Congress,
former Chairman of the Committee on Diplomacy, and leader of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs during the Baron do Rio Branco's administration
of Brazil's Foreign Relations.



IMPrensa NACIONAL
RIO DE JANEIRO — BRAZIL

1915

JX1425
.A2

NO. 1111
AUGUST 1910

DEDICATED

TO THE

SECOND PAN-AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS

338089

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

INTRODUCTION

A *Ilusão Americana*, the famous book published in Brazil soon after the proclamation of the Republic, undoubtedly created a deep impression throughout the country. Its author, a young and ardent Monarchist, sought to combat to the death, by any and all means, the system of government which we had adopted, and which was nothing more nor less than an intelligent and well wrought-out adaptation of the political formulae which had largely contributed to the rapid growth and astonishing prosperity of the United States of America. He had gone even further; he had proposed to demonstrate that, in the great Republic of the North, the evils and perils for other nations on the Continent resided fully as much in the institutions themselves as in the men who directed them; he had endeavored thus to incite the patriotic sentiments of the Brazilians, by proclaiming that American imperialism was far more pernicious and voracious than European imperialism; and thus, in the somber colors which factious passions always lend to all men, even to those who seem to be most clear-headed and wellbalanced, he concluded by foreseeing days of calamity and despair for the latin peoples,

who believed they had found in the Monroe Doctrine, and in the glorious liberal traditions of the most powerful of the American peoples, victorious and indestructable elements for the security of their political autonomy and for the constantly increasing consolidation of their public liberties.

Such a task was not difficult for the ardent monarchist who had not submitted, as had nearly all his correligionaries, to the accomplished fact of the overthrow of the Monarchy, convinced as nearly all of them were that the Empire of Brazil was synonymous with the Emperor, and that along with senile decline of the latter the former had disappeared in the midst of a social phenomenon, so inevitable and spontaneous that the revolution was accomplished without the shedding of a drop of blood.

Vast indeed is the bibliography of authors who in Europe have busied themselves in combating the daily increasing and preponderant influence of the fatherland of Washington in world affairs. Since the United States had forced themselves upon the nations of the old world as a power of the first-class, showing them at first that the weaker nations of the two Americas were not in the same category as the Africans and Asiatics as regards their colonial policies, and later demonstrating that these European nations would not be permitted to interfere in the destinies of this part of the civilized world without the States being heard from, it was but natural that, in order to weaken their constantly growing power, these same European nations, on seeing the United States arise as a dangerous rival, should strive to create for them a feeling of antipathy and suspicion on the part of the other countries of the same continent, in which they would always have against themselves the feeling that they were the strongest of all.

It is but just to declare that this propaganda of the politicians and public men of the Old World never succeeded in making proselytes here. If the statesmen of the Empire,

because of questions having to do with dynastic interests, always showed a thoughtless reserve in striving to promote a policy of open alliance and frank fraternization with the administrations of the White House, nevertheless the Brazilian people as such were never backward in showing their sympathy towards the people of North America.

In truth, as we said in our book «Tratados de Commercio do Brazil» (Commercial Treaties of Brazil), the United States was the first nation to recognize our independence in 1823, while even before, increasingly since 1787, they had encouraged us by means of such words as those of Jefferson, to declare ourselves an autonomous and sovereign nation; they had helped us in a decisive moment with their moral backing, prestige and honored as they already were in the opinion of the great powers. During the long period in which the Empire dominated here, only once were the kindly and reciprocal relations of friendship between the two nations altered in the least, and when the Republic was proclaimed, it was the Washington Government which preceded all others in the recognition of the new order of things; not less precious to us was the spontaneous and unselfish help which they gave us when we sorely needed it in a trying moment of civil discord, which threatened to terminate our political destinies on the Continent.

The fact, however is that, notwithstanding all these eloquent historical witnesses, the book *A Ilusão Americana* produced a deep impression on public opinion in Brazil. Its author, in order to create unpopularity for the first republican administrations, which had, against all dynastic prejudices, endeavored to consolidate still more our friendly relations with the United States, astutely made capital out of the libels published by European politicians, accusing the North American people of misinterpreting the Monroe Doctrine, and of being interested only from a utilitarian stand-point, without patriotic ideals, in and for the dollar. In his opinion, just

as happened yesterday in Mexico, so to morrow Brazil and the other South American nations would become victims of the imperialistic ambitions so well symbolized in the eagle of the yankee shield, which, though it had been a protector of the weak when not very strong itself, had now, after having attained growth, closed up its olympic wings that it might have a part in the despoiling of the weak.

The proclamation of the Republic found the writer in the very flower of his twenty years of age, and he here confesses that he did not escape the malign influence of this fascinating reading. The author of the *Ilusão Americana* had shown himself in this work so deeply inspired in patriotism, had had so many apprehensions aroused as to the destinies of Brazil, which he considered to be about to fall into dismemberment, and he had so convinced himself as to the complete loss of that national unity which had been the great foundation of all the political greatness of the Continent, that not a few of his readers forgot that he himself was a monarchist, while they themselves were being led to believe that, fully as much as the German peril, in view of the concentration of colonists in the south, a new American peril now reared its head over the fertile regions of the Amazon.

It took but a short time, however, for radical transformation to come over the judgments of the writer, after he had studied thoroughly the history of the various international questions of Brazil and of the two Americas, and the intellectual relations which bind us to the North American writers, who indeed are unfortunately but little known amongst us. When as a journalist it became the writer's duty to discuss the question of the Missões of Amapá and especially of the Acre, during a critical moment of the political life of the Republic; and when later, as a member of Congress and Chairman of the Committee on Diplomacy in the House of Representatives, charged with the analysis of diplomatic questions of great import, the conviction became firmly rooted in his

mind that our Brazilian statesmen had acted with consummate skill, great wisdom and nobility of views, and political tact, in striving to strengthen day by day our longstanding friendship with the United States, thus making of that friendship the corner-stone of American liberties.

The theme which we endeavor to present in our book «O Brazil perante a doutrina de Monroe» (Brazil and the Monroe Doctrine) is a documentary exposition of the studies made in our political history, and which forced upon us the conclusion that the friendship which binds together the United States and Brazil is precious indeed, and so far salutary, as the equilibrium of the Continent and the peace and progress of all the American republics depend upon it. And today we can thus express ourselves without fear of suspicion or insinuation.

In view of our exceptional geographical situation, we now constitute a nation well prepared advantageously to defend our highest and best interests, economical and political, in the family of nations. Closed for ever as are all our frontier questions by the immortal work of Rio Branco; endowed with a rich and fertile soil as is our fatherland; enjoying to a marked degree the advantages of modern western civilization; as do our people; possessed of magnanimous civic sentiments, and also counting upon the cooperation of the many foreigners who come to us, and who, by a sociological law applicable to all recently formed nationalities, become as thoroughly attached to the soil as are the native-born sons, we Brazilians need not fear that any foreign intervention will make itself felt in our internal life, nor need we consider the material assistance of any friendly nation at a time of possible external complications.

We can thus speak without its appearing to be flattery of any nation which may deem itself stronger, nor a threat to any nations which may really believe themselves weaker. We represent a nation which has come into its own consciousness, which recognizes its own value and its own high social duties,

while at the same time it realizes its historical destiny on the Continent.

In 1815, years before our independence from the mother country, Alphonse Beauchamp wrote regarding our progress as follows: «The Brazilian Empire appears to be marked out some day to enjoy the highest destinies. Who can calculate before hand to what lengths will this newly risen nation be borne by its nascent energies? Brazil, as powerful as it is magnificent, will follow and rapidly alter the growing power of the United States. How rich strong and invulnerable is this new country of the southern hemisphere! How noble and independent is its destiny! Countless fleets could not prevail against it; formidable armies would threaten it in vain! All apparently indicates a growing prosperity of long duration.»

However it may be, one thing is certain, and that is: as Brazil and the United States are the only nations of the Continent, which have not the same ethnic origin and which do not speak a common language, it behooves them to cherish increasingly this natural and spontaneous alliance, which for nearly a century now has been morally binding them together as sister-nations, the two greatest powers of the New World, and consequently the chief heralds, which they must never cease to be, of peace, of order and of the political liberties of all America.

CHAPTER I

The Monroe Doctrine and the american peril

J. Ribet in his interesting book on the *Transformations of the Monroe Doctrine*, exclaims: «After the phrase «America for Americans», followed by the similar phrase «America for the North Americans», it will not be paradoxical to form a new phrase «The World for the United States».

In these successive formulae the French writer, doubtless one of the most passionate adversaries of the great Republic of our Continent, sought to demonstrate that the imperialistic policy of which the late administrations of the White House are accused is nothing more than a natural development of the principles proclaimed by the immortal statesman James Monroe, in his famous message of 1823.

«There are those who claim», adds he, «that imperialism marks the final outcome and destruction of the Monroe Doctrine. M. Geouffre de Lapradelle, amongst others, has maintained that the Americans declare themselves traitors to Monroe in their imperialism, but this opinion arises from the confusion in which they persist, seeing only in the message of 1823 one special theory — Americanism or Monroeism — which such jurists have taken for their meditation.»

«They forget, however, that Monroe was not striving to formulate an inflexible rule of law for the nations. His doctrine, on the contrary, is the general expression of a philosophic idea, the *resumé* of the aspirations of a race and the guide of their destinies. By this doctrine one can as readily justify attack as defense in the name of the higher interests of the American people and for the sake of this formidable principle: *The United States should become increasingly a powerful nation*».

«Imperialism is not therefore inimical to the Monroe Doctrine, rather it is a natural consequence thereof. With the message of 1823 as its Gospel, and the doctrine of Emerson as its breviary, the United States embark upon the conquest of the world.»

This is not an isolated opinion. What one European publicist says about the Monroe Doctrine and its influence in the evolution of the American Union and the other Republics of the New World, is generally a *resumé* of what all the others say. Even more than by political rivalries these odious prejudices are justified at the present moment by the economic struggle between the markets of the two continents separated by the Atlantic. It is indeed an ingenious process which they use; that of maintaining before the other countries of the Western Hemisphere, still very weak in industries and born from a different racial origin, that the United States constitute a permanent peril to their territorial integrity and political autonomy. If the nerve of commercial transactions is credit, and this reposes on a reciprocal confidence between those who trade, then nothing is more natural than that the European markets should continue to direct the bulk of their exports to those countries in which their great competitor in South America is shown always under the alarming appearance of an insatiable conqueror.

The American peril is thus denounced by all these writers

and thinkers of the Old World under two fearful forms: political and moral imperialism, and economic imperialism. Both are considered as having been rooted in the principle of Monroe. «The influence of this doctrine, says Ribet, soon spread with all its innovating force even into the remotest corners of the vital organism of the United States: but nowhere was its action so manifestly acute and penetrating from the very beginning as on its economic side.». Calling to mind the words of Sydney-Sherwood he further endeavors to show that «Modern protectionism, that is, the restriction of foreign competition and the encouragement of internal trade as free as possible, has always been the policy of those who in this century raised up empires», and furthermore that «this protectionism in large part is the work of americans, its first expression being the policy begun by Alexander Hamilton from the time of Washington. Inaugurating protectionism as the customs policy of the United States, he had comprehended perfectly that a country, still unorganized if it wished to grow, must defend itself with high tariffs against the competition of nations already organized.».

Nor does this French writer stop here. He seeks to demonstrate that, if Hamilton had as his ideal the protection of his country as a mother protects her child in its first vacillating steps in life, Monroe, contemplating his country as already a vigorous adult; sought to strengthen it by causing it to address Europe as a rival, inasmuch as «it was the region of the world richest in coal and in ores, most fertile in all kinds of food-stuffs, and capable of making the bold Yankee say to the old-fashioned European: «I go to your house because you need me, but you need not come to mine for I do not need you».

He then describes the rapid and extraordinary progress of the United States under its *regime* of protectionism, from the time of its baptism of blood in the war between the

states of the North and South until the famous Mc Kinley bill, which gave to it its final and official affirmation by openly proclaiming the expansionist policy of the Union, and by giving their death-blow, by means of a monstrous tariff, to a great number of important industries of Germany, England and France. He shows how immigration is understood in that extraordinary country, whose dominant institutions correspond so well to the genius and the aspirations of its first colonizers. The human ocean which has been poured out there for nearly a century, including Italians, Germans, Scandinavians, English, Bohemians, French and others, has all been assimilated, to the point of their losing their fatherland, habits, traditions and even race !

The Chinese, most dangerous of all these elements, considered a parasite, was soon brutally eliminated, for the *Yankee* knows how to defend himself admirably ! Indigent and infirm immigrants are no longer allowed to land, as was the case with the Chinese, on its privileged soil ! The Monroe Doctrine, instead of being a defense for the weak, became a shield for the strong !

After this tirade. Ribet closes his book in an effort to refute the opinions of the German Professor, Hugo Munsterberg, who, in one of his books, had maintained that the Monroe Doctrine must perish for no nation can forever live on a mere caprice. «No, exclaims Ribet, the Monroe Doctrine is not literally a caprice, as it is not a mere potentiality; in it there exists the whole economic direction of the country, affirmed by the incomparable results which it has already produced. And, as to its spirit, this doctrine is the Gospel which upholds energetically all the contemporary acts of the United States. It is the weapon of the North Americans against Europe, a weapon which Europe does not turn against them, so that they have thus been able with safety to extend their power over all America and the

Universe. Without the Monroe Doctrine, Pan-Americanism and *Yankee* Imperialism would not exist; they are its progeny !»

While thus passionately expressing himself, this ardent French writer did not imagine probably that, pages further on in this same book, he himself would justify not as an inevitable consequence of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, but as a result of the ideas in vogue amongst the great powers of the contemporary world, this whole threatening policy of protectionism and economic expansion, of which he so cruelly accuses the great North American nation.

« Since 1870, says he in the chapter to which he gave the curious title of *Economic Technique of Imperialism*, the immigrant nations, which had been principally England in the beginning and later Germany, have been greatly multiplied. Austria, Norway, Sweden, Italy, France, China and Japan began to send to these new lands great currents of men and of capital. Centers of colonization were founded, amongst others, by Germany in South America. Conquest supplied beforehand, or, as in some cases, even better, completed the work of emigration.»

« England prepared a colonial empire of two or three hundred millions scattered over all latitudes. Russia prolonged its dominions to Siberia and the transcaucasian regions. France went to Indo-China and to Madagascar. Germany spread out over the seas of Oceania and through South America. Italy strew corpses over the plains of Abissynia. Japan struggled with Russia because of Korea.» And then he adds: « It was only in 1898 that the United States decided to no longer resist the current of expansion, which was drawing all the civilized peoples in its wake.»

If such be the case it is only within the past few years that the Government of Washington resolved to imitate the policy of expansion, already in practice on a large scale and for many years by the great European powers, the most

that they can be accused of is of having mistakenly abandoned the international policy which, for over a century, had assured the greatness and the integrity of the North American Union, and of not reacting against the influence of the ideas of conquest and absorption already victorious in the countries of the old world; but to attribute to a transformation of the Monroe Doctrine an evil common to peoples that had so strongly combated and repudiated it, is worse than to persist in ignoring the laws of sociology and history, it is as if one strove to give the most absurd solutions to social problems which, indeed, as soon as enunciated, present their own solution.

CHAPTER II

The economic imperialism of the United States

With much propriety and wisdom did George Weulerse define imperialism as one of the great phenomena of our times. «In its continuous action at all points of the globe, said he, it is a policy that day by day, under our very eyes, is modifying the map of the nations. British imperialism invades south Africa, pushes its way north and south, crosses the continent from east to west, and dreams still of constituting in the four corners of the earth the most paradoxical of all empires. German imperialism not only opens to German commerce and colonization vast domains, of most diverse characters and at greatest distances, but even covets a rich part of the Austrian succession. Russian imperialism threatens all Asia; for a long time it weighed upon Turkey and Persia, and advanced upon India; and now it seeks to disrupt China, as it would have spread over Korea, had it not been met firmly by the recently-born Japanese imperialism.

It was thus natural that, from the view-point of its political economy, the United States should seek to safeguard its great interests in foreign markets and assure its own con-

tinental stability, in as much as other powers were assuming an aggressive attitude, extending their own domains and laying hold of important territories here and there in mid-ocean, either because of their strategical position or for their utility as commercial emporiums of the first order.

This has been, indeed, the chief concern of its statesmen in all the international events, in which they have been involved. In the cases of the Islands of Samôa, Hawaii and the Philippines, the Panamá Canal, European intervention in the Far East, the liberation of Cuba, and the much-discussed Trust of the Seas, which was to monopolize all the maritime companies of the Universe, the american statesmen were accused of having embarked upon the perilous adventures of that same imperialism which reigns without let or hindrance in those very countries which dispute the title of the United States to political supremacy in the new world.

This is the question reduced to its proper terms. Pan-americanism, as defined by writers inimical to the United States, (that is, as the political, economic and moral protectorate of the *yankees* over all other American peoples), is by no means a logical consequence of the Monroe doctrine; nor indeed did there originate from this doctrine, by deduction in deduction, the imperialistic formula which may be understood by some to have been recently adopted by the great Republic, and which differs in nothing from the policy long ago proclaimed and followed by the great powers of the Old World.

For proof of these assertions it is but necessary to appeal to the facts themselves, which have been used as a base libel against the fatherland of Washington, for the purpose of creating antipathy in the other nations of the continent. Let us begin with the case of Hawaii and Samôa; the afore-mentioned Ribet writes as follows: «The annexation of the Hawaiian Islands has no history. From time immemorial Honolulu had been for the Americans what Nice and St. Raphael

Hawaii

were for the spleen-afflicted French and English. From the time when San Francisco became one of the great ports of the United States, all the traffic of Hawaii passed through its gates. From that time on all its commerce, even with Europe, was carried on via *Yankee-land*. Japan alone was able to attempt competition, but on a very small scale, for in 1886, for example, out of a total of transactions to the value of \$16,131,400.00, fully \$14,979,400.00 were with the United States. Thus Hawaii while having its most vital connections with the American Republic, could only aspire to one thing: *become as soon as possible an integral part of the American Union*. There thus arose a courteous struggle between the islands on the one hand, offering themselves, and the United States on the other hand, refusing, but with constantly decreasing firmness in its refusals. The United States early consented to the free entrance into its ports of sugar from the islands. Soon after came the public declaration that the States would never consent to having the islands colonized by any European power. A message of president Tyler, dated december 30, 1842, confirming a note of Secretary of State Webster, was very strong on this point; it declared that five-sixths of the ships that visited the islands sailed from American ports, and therefore it was but natural that the Washington Government should be on the lookout to ward off any foreign intrusion in Hawaii. Another note, of june 13, 1843, insisted in the same language, affirming that the United States would oppose even by force the conquest of the archipelago by any European nation. Clayton in 1850, president Filmore in his message of 1851, and Marcy in 1855 made similar declarations; but never gave any indication of a purpose to annex Hawaii; on july 5, 1868, Secretary of State Seward made clear, on the contrary, that the spirit of the American people, always inimical to colonial conquests, would oppose taking possession of these islands. At that time, the imperialistic formula had not been deduced from the Monroe

doctrine, Pan-Americanism as it appeared in the message of president Polk, was still in process of elaboration. It was therefore necessary to delay, even though it be but for a short time.

«In 1881 Blaine took up the question. In his opinion the United States were deeply interested in any movement, discussion or negotiation, which might provoke to action any foreign power in the islands. They could not forget that the Hawaiian Islands were destined to become American in a not distant future. A note of December 1, 1881 declared that the islands could by no natural laws or political necessity become part of an Asiatic system but only of an American. On this basis, in the presidency of Mac Kinley, hesitation was no longer possible; in 1898 the islands were annexed, and since 1900 have been considered as territory of the American Union.».

Referring to the incorporation of the Samôan Islands to the American domain, the celebrated writer quoted above is even more precise; in short and graceful sentences he explains: «The Samôan Islands, precisely like the Hawaiians, offered themselves to the United States many times, beginning in 1860. On each one of these occasions the American Consul in Apia did not fail to proclaim the protectorate of his country over the Archipelago, only to have his acts disavowed each time by his home government. The United States in this action did not show lack of interest in their rights in Samôa, but were obliged to remain faithful to their policy of non-colonization. Secretary of State Bayard wrote to the Consul at Apia on February 27, 1886: «If colonial expansion were the policy of the United States; our country would have equal rights with England and Germany over the Samoan Islands.» Furthermore, when, in order to terminate a war of secession which was ruining the entire archipelago; and especially was depopulating Upolu; the Governments of London and Berlin thought to intervene; the United States could not avoid being involved in the com-

bined movement. They took part in the conference of 1889 in Berlin; at which the Islands were declared independent; under the joint protectorate of the three nations who signed the convention, England, Germany and the United States».

«The Samôan Islands were living in peace under this regime when, early in 1899, new troubles arose, in a conflict between the partisans of two rival chiefs, Tarm and Mataafa, who were disputants for the succession of King Malietav, deceased in 1898. England and the United States supported Tarm, and Germany Mataafa. The latter resisted vigorously and forced his conquered opponents to take refuge on the British Cruiser *Paprix*. The English and Americans then bombarded, from March 15th to April 1st, the positions occupied by the victorious natives.

An Anglo-American detachment, on disembarking, fell into an ambush and was massacred. This was too much, the diplomatic cabinets intervened, and plenipotentiaries departed from London, Berlin and New York for the archipelago, where they met in the form of a joint commission and decided upon a dissolution of the protectorate. Three treaties were signed by these delegates; the first, dated November 7, 1899, referred to the King of Greece the arbitration of what indemnities should be paid to the German subjects who had suffered loss by bombardment; the other two, dated November 8 and December 2 of the same year, gave full possession of two of the islands to Germany, and the others to the United States. Great Britain renounced all of its rights over Samôa, but as compensation Germany ceded to her that part of the Solomon Islands which were hers, and all her rights over the Tonga Islands. The question of Samôa was thus definitely settled by the sentence of King Oscar in October 1902.».

The logical deduction from all this, prejudiced as is the writer Ribet against the United States, is clearly seen to

be that, if the United States finally intervened in the question of these archipelagos besieged as they were on all sides by the colonizing appetite of certain European countries, they did not do so impelled by the imperialistic spirit of the American people, which indeed had always been adverse, from the very foundation of their political institutions, to all adventures of conquest and absorption, but rather by the very instinct of conservation, and that only after prolonged resistance to such extremes the Washington Government, conscious of its grave responsibilities for the maintenance of its position of prestige in the family of nations, could not fold its arms and remain impassive before the attitude assumed by the great powers who were striving to break down inter-continental equilibrium, by seizing strategic points of the first class in the Pacific, such as they already had in the Atlantic, and thus to take up positions in which they could be constantly threatening the very political integrity of the American Union. *Yankee* Imperialism, thus proclaimed from one day to another, must have profoundly irritated the autocratic governments across the sea. It was an arm of defense against European imperialism, already prepared for audacious blows in the Far East, and doubtless later on in the more or less weak and poorly organized countries of South America.

The acquisition of the Phillipines, decreed in one of the clauses of the Treaty of Paris, between the United States and Spain, at the close of the rapid and bloody war for the liberation of Cuba, was also a logical consequence of the situation which world affairs had created for the North American people in the Far East.

No nation of the world, not even Russia nor England, has larger or more valuable interests in China than the United States. A dominating influence in the Pacific because of their colossal commerce and industries, inasmuch as only very recently has Japan begun to compete, and as San Francisco is

much nearer the great consuming centers of China and other Asiatic countries than the ports of England, Germany, France and Italy, it was but natural that the succeeding administrations of the White House should begin to take part in the struggles and ambitions of the European powers at the Court of Peking. The appearance of this new participant before the partition of China and its domains, the prospect of which had for so long stirred up the appetites of Europe and had been as often frustrated, very properly irritated the self-invited fellowguests of the anticipated banquet, at which such appetizing game should be served up, but which had never yet come to a realization because of the inevitable disagreement in the organization of the *menu*. This irritation of the European governments increased in 1900 when armed intervention took place on the part of the great powers because of the massacre of Christians in Chinese territory and the assaults upon the Legations in Peking. When the United States sent its troops and war-vessels to Chinese waters, a formal declaration was made beforehand by its Government, to the effect that under no circumstances would they take part in any dismemberment of the great Asiatic empire, since become a Republic. In official notes of the 29th and 30th August of that year the Washington administration publicly and positively declared its intentions. In the first one, these words occur: «The Government of the United States received with great pleasure the reiterated declaration of Russia that it had no purpose whatever of territorial acquisition in China, and that, while acting in concert with the other powers, it sought only to protect its Legation and to help the Chinese Government to put down disorder. The Government of the United States has always been moved in the past and will continue to be moved in the future by these same principles; and the loyal declaration of Russia is in absolute accord with various declarations made to the United States by other nations. Inasmuch as all the powers have affirmed that they have no

wish for territorial aggrandizement in China, and having attained the end they had in view, the liberation of their Legations in Peking, it should not be difficult by means of joint negotiations to arrive at a friendly agreement with China, by which all the rights recognized by treaty to the various powers shall be confirmed for the future, an open door be assured, the interests and property of foreign citizens be guaranteed, and full reparation be made for all loss and damage which they may have suffered.»

In the second note, dated August 30th, North American diplomacy even more clearly outlined its thought. «The purposes of the powers in China should be: to protect the lives and property of all foreigners; to prevent the present disorder from spreading to the other provinces, and to repress the same entirely; to seek a solution which will assure the reign of permanent peace in China; to maintain its territorial integrity; to guarantee all the rights decreed in treaties or by international law to the powers; and to safeguard the principle of liberty of commerce in all points of the Chinese Empire.»

China thus became debtor chiefly to this energetic attitude of American diplomacy for its integrity, while at the same time the United States assured its commercial supremacy in the Pacific, which had been greatly accentuated during the Russo-Japanese war.

However, the victory of Japan, which had as in a single night appeared to claim its place of honor as one of the great powers in the family of nations of the civilized world, and the growing rivalries of the European countries in the face of the astonishing competition of American products in the centers of consumption of the world, could not fail to act as a salutary warning to the Washington administrations, jealous as they had properly become of the ground already won in the Asiatic markets for exportation of their industrial and agricultural products.

The purchase of the Philippines thus brought to the United States extraordinary advantages. Inhabited by four diverse races, which lived in constant and sanguine intestinal discord, ill-cared-for during the domination of Spain, whose colonizing processes were always belated and tyrannical, these islands, as soon as they fell into the hands of the Americans, were transformed within a few months into an excellent commercial emporium, as well as a magnificent strategic point, while their inhabitants entered at once upon a political and administrative regime capable of guaranteeing them lasting and fertile tranquility.

Finally, not to mention the great stir made about the frustrated «trust of the sea», another of the audacious plans proposed by Pierpont Morgan, with the daring purpose of consolidating once for all the maritime commerce of his country, the case of the great canal, which connects the Atlantic and the Pacific between the two Americas, has always been one of the night-mares most persistently exploited in connection with the economic imperialism of the United States.

Indeed the magnificent dream of Bolivar, to make the Canal at Panama the exclusive property and a perpetual pledge of the brotherhood of the American peoples, had revealed as early as 1825 to the practical genius of the Yankees the great economic and political advantages which would accrue to the United States if some day the opening of the canal could be made a reality. This idea came to be the absorbing preoccupation of the North American statesmen in successive generations, as soon as Holland, first, and England and even France began to make trial of every resource to bring about this daring project, which would give such great vantage ground to their foreign policies.

The diplomatic campaign which was waged about this important subject, one of most delicate and involved ever registered in the annals of the civilized world, made most

clear, from the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to the Hay-Pauncefote, and from this to the final settlement of the question in the Roosevelt administration, of purpose, the clear-sighted vision and the unwearying tact of the men who have had under their responsibility and vigilance the great destinies of the Republic. Once again the Monroe Doctrine triumphed. The key to inter-oceanic navigation did not come into the possession, as seemed inevitable on more than one occasion, of any one of the European powers, which indeed have not yet become reconciled to their failure to find on this side of the ocean, with the facility which they had always imagined, fertile and precious lands for their exploitation, such as they had found in the Dark Continent. And if the Pacific shall not become, to use the phrase of the above-quoted writer, *an American lake*, because it will always have Japan in its bosom to disturb its placid waters, America will at least never have to pay tribute to any European flag when it wishes to cross its own lands to navigate the waters which constitute, in deed and by right, its most precious and glorious patrimony.

CHAPTER III

Political and moral imperialism in the United States

The marquis de Barral, no less bitter in his attitude toward the North Americans than Ribet, in his recent book *From Monroe to Roosevelt*, in treating of the development of political imperialism in the United States, divides it into three successive periods, which he terms: the *phase of invasion*, the *phase of aggression*, and the *world phase*.

The author of the *Transformation of the Monroe Doctrine* was not so daring in his analysis. He satisfied himself with denouncing the great Republic for thrusting itself forward, when scarcely out of its long-honored isolation, as participant in world-affairs, beginning with the Hague Conference of 1899.

«The United States, says he, in following out its destiny has certainly been favored by lucky stars. In the history of nations there is probably no other instance of a people who, on suddenly appearing from out the shadows of its isolation, has been able, in consequence of a chain of fortuitous circumstances, to take such a large place on the world's stage and see the essential and fundamental elements of its dearest aspirations so rapidly achieve an assured success.»

This learned writer then criticizes, as alarming symptoms of the dangerous intrusion of the White House administrations in international affairs, especially in relation to the Old World, the attitude assumed by the North American delegates in that famous council, convened by the Czar of Russia. He then strives to show how American politics, which might possibly have an apparently justifiable interest in the questions dealing with the Far East, ~~sought further by all the means~~ in its power to find a pretext for intervening in Turkey and Roumania, and did so in a most brutal and noisome way, taking advantage of religious persecutions in order to arrogantly give the impression to the European powers that, on the banks of the Bosphorus, the American nation was not embarrassed by any ties with those who proclaimed their exclusive right of action, but was really above taking any interest in the Eastern question, in as much as it considered itself superior to all Europe itself. And finally, while severely attacking the attitude of the Washington Government because of its protest against the massacres of Jews in Kichineff, and praising the noble energy of Russia in repelling this attempt at intervention in its internal politics, and while at the same time sharply condemning the barbarity of lynchings in North America, he affirms that the conduct of Ex-President Roosevelt in this affair will always remain as a remarkable symptom of the political and moral imperialism of a nation which, while jealous'y reserving for itself an entire continent, still pretends to intervene in the domestic affairs of other nations whose citizens it aims to drive away from its own shores.

The Marquis de Barral is more profound and minute in his observations. He analyses the political imperialism of the United States as a kind of morbid predisposition of its national organism, growing slowly but surely from the very first years of its foudation as an independent nation. For him the supreme ambition of American statesmen is to make

of all America *one nation*, and secure its domination of the whole world.

The annexation of Texas by the United States was, in the opinion of this author, the first step in what he chooses to call the *phase of invasion* of their nascent imperialism. But he himself describes how, after much reluctance and only because of the imminent peril of this important territory of the continent falling into the possession of England, France or Holland, the authorities of the United States finally decided to yield to the reiterated solicitations of the inhabitants, anxious as they themselves were to be saved from the long and bloody period of wars and civil discord in which they had been struggling for over thirty years.

In truth, Texas, after freeing itself from the yoke of Spain in 1812, had never had an instant of peace and tranquillity, but had striven from that time on, either to live as an independent state, to unite with Mexico, or to join in with the United States. These last, however, had always refused to accept proposals of this kind, and when in 1816 the North American General Mac Gregor, on his own initiative, invaded the State of Texas, at that time suffering under the most egregious tyranny, and tried to deliver it over to the American Government, the Washington administration severely censured his conduct and annulled all the precipitate and thoughtless acts which he had practiced. Later on, though having already purchased Luiziana from France and Florida from Spain, the United States would not listen to the proposals of Texas, which had just emerged from a victorious war with Mexico.

In 1840, however, the situation of this unhappy state had reached the dark phase of political dissolution. Several of the European powers, in view of the attitude taken by the American Government, revealed their intentions of eventually making of Texas, with its admirable position on the Gulf of Mexico, a colonial outpost, which revelations

finally led President Tyler, on April 12, 1844, to sign the treaty which annexed Texas to the domain of the United States; this treaty, however, because of the hostile attitude of the Senate, was only definitely concluded between the two countries a year later.

delivered to Mexico by the U.S.
 Yucatan, a Mexican province, which had been a victim of cruel anarchy for many years, appealed several times, in much the same way as Texas, to the United States, and also to England and Spain, pleading for an energetic intervention that would save her from the critical situation in which she found herself before the government of Mexico, impotent to guarantee her civil liberties according to the constitution.

Mexican public opinion, however, was already highly excited over the incorporation of Texas, and war seemed inevitable between the two neighboring republics. If the United States in this emergency had acceded to the appeal of the province of Yucatan, torn as it was by such grave intestinal discord, not only would Mexico have been fully justified in opening hostilities, but such an act would have alarmed all the other nations of Central and South America.

«The province of Yucatan, says a well-informed writer, situated in Central America, did not constitute, as in the case of Texas, contiguous territory to the North American domain, and furthermore, in the case of Yucatan the American Government would not have the same excuse as it had in regard to Texas, for the appeal of the latter came as from an independent state, and consequently master of its own destinies, free to deliver over its sovereignty to another state, if it so wished. The former region had never made a declaration of its independence, and it was, officially at least, a simple province of Mexico. To take possession of it would be to practice an act of direct conquest.»

Even so however, it was not long before war between the United States and Mexico, still unreconciled to the loss

of Texas, was declared. Mexican armies invaded the great Republic, which in turn blockaded and even took possession of several important ports of the enemy's territory. The struggle became fierce and bloody. For three years Mexico endeavored to resist valiently the constantly increasing and victorious forces of the North American Union, but finally she was forced to accept peace, according to the Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty, which ceded to the United States the provinces of Lower California and New Mexico.

Yucatan, in the mean time, continued under its primitive conquerors. Historical and geographical reasons had not brought about, as was the case in the above-mentioned Mexican ex-provinces, its natural incorporation into the territory of the North American Union. The recent treaty of peace had doubtless accentuated in a most decisive way the American frontier on the continent, but, even so, if the Monroe Doctrine on the one hand would not permit so important a region to suddenly become a possession of any European power, no more would it justify its becoming part and parcel of the territory of the United States, with which indeed it had no ethical or political affinities, nor was it even contiguous territory.

In their analysis of the Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty and of the Mexican-American war itself, European authors who have written upon the subject have been too severe in their strictures upon the White House administration. It should be borne in mind that, from 1845 to 1848, when these events were transpiring, the situation of the United States, if not as precarious and dark as that of its southern neighbor, could not however be considered as flattering and tranquil. The French expedition to Mexico coincided with the American War of Secession. While the imperialism of the Old World thought to take advantage of the bloodthirsty anarchy then reigning in Mexico to implant a new Empire and

by this means extend its conquests north and south, the United States, while threatened at the same time by its apparently imminent partition, felt keenly the blow aimed at it in the Oregon question with England, and in this dire contingency realized, through attempts made here and there in both Americas to demoralize and weaken the principles of Monroe, of how great value these same principles were for the maintainance of the integrity and autonomy of the nations of the New World.

In describing the tremendous difficulties before the White House Government at this time, one of the French writers frequently quoted here thus grievously betrays his own position: «Never did Europe, says he, show greater acrimony in its relations with the New World, and never did it give evidence of more subtlety in prying into the internal affairs of the American Republics, than from the very moment when it became evident that the principal champion of the autonomy of the two Americas and of the principle of European non-intervention would find it impossible to reinforce its protests by the use of armed force. All the cannon of the United States were engaged in the fratricidal struggle which was drenching the soil with blood; how then could some of them be withdrawn for the purpose of preventing, for instance, the combined fleets of England, France and Spain from taking possession of the chief ports of Mexico? Exactly this thing happened at the moment when hostilities opened between slave-holders and abolitionists in the *Disunited States of America*.»

Then he adds, in an effort to emphatically justify the joint action of the European powers in American affairs:

«The incredible anarchy in which Mexico had been submerged ever since its independence, the assassinations of foreigners and native residents, the pillage and sacking of property belonging to Europeans, the systematic refusals to grant

indemnities, or once granted, the constant subterfuges resorted to in order to avoid payment, the failure on the part of President Juarez to fulfill the financial obligations assumed by, his predecessor and rival, Miramon, in favor of Jeeke, a Swiss naturalized French citizen; in short, everything that we have recently seen in Venezuela, constituted the more than justified complaints of various European nations, especially England, Spain and France.

«Of these three the last-named insisted upon exactions of less importance as to their gravity, but at the same time less open to discussion, and yet had become most involved in the struggle, until she finally was left isolated to maintain her pretensions. She had as sovereign a dreamer, of conceptions more magnificent and chimerical than practical; Napoleon thought to set against the rising supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race, both in America and in Europe, a formidable alliance of the Latin peoples. And besides this he began to feel the necessity of organizing an expedition to distract attention from his plans in regard to internal politics, for France had become habituated to the constant victories of her arms on the battle-fields of the Crimea and of Italy, and began to believe that nothing was impossible that she wished to accomplish.

The same writer continues his efforts to justify the ambitions of the various European governments, especially that of his own country France: «In the beginning the expedition to Mexico had no purpose of intervening politically, nor of imposing by brute force any constitutional modifications in that country. Spain, France and Italy were simply creditors, who had lost their patience and demanded for their resident citizens financial indemnities to cover damages in the past and effective guaranties for the future. It was with this program in view that the three powers united in the treaty of October 31st, 1861, and invited the United States to formulate similar exactions.

«In the preamble to this convention the high contracting parties took care to make exposition of their motives and of the purpose of their intervention. They affirmed their disinterestedness, and solemnly agreed not to attempt any acquisition whatever of territory, and not to exercise any influence whatever that would affect the independence and autonomy of Mexico. What was not written in the treaty, but was expressed confidentially in the interchange of opinions and views upon the subject, was that the parties were all convinced that Mexico, so profoundly disturbed in its internal regime, could never be permanently and effectually pacified except by an authority of greater firmness and more stable power than that of the various Presidents who were deposed at such frequent intervals. And therefore, it would be with the utmost pleasure that they, the high contracting parties, would see Mexico adopt a monarchical constitution, and accept as sovereign a prince of one of the royal families of the Old World! The candidate had even been designated in advance, the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph! Thus would France heal the wounds of her war with Italy, and would be pardoned for her complacency toward Victor Emmanuel, by helping elevate to a new throne a Habsburg prince.

«Though England looked with but scant favor upon these plans of Napoleon, yet she declared that, if the Mexicans should applaud the choice of this prince, she would give her approval to the realization of the project. This condescension on the part of England was attributed to the fact that the wife of the royal candidate was first-cousin to the Prince Consort, daughter of Leopold I, of Belgium, who was thought to exercise great influence over the spirit of Queen Victoria.

«So far as Spain was concerned, she had no prince to propose, inasmuch as the crown had passed from Ferdinand VII to Isabella, who had only one son. She would thus feel

compensated by having called to the new throne in America one of the descendents of her illustrious Carlos V.

«It was not long, therefore, before the fleet of the Triple Alliance, laden with numerous troops, set out for Mexico and anchored off Vera Cruz. This fleet was commanded by the Spanish General Prim, and at sight of it President Juarez immediately offered to pay all the indemnities which were exacted, and to give surety that his promises would be faithfully executed. Spain and England declared themselves satisfied at this solution, and signed the treaty of Soledade, on February 19th, 1862; but the French plenipotentiary refused to sign the treaty, and demanded that, besides the indemnities exacted, Juarez should further pay the debt to Jecker incurred by the rebel chief Mitañon, his recently defeated rival. Juarez refused, whereupon the French Emperor, who only awaited some pretext for action, ordered his forces to open hostilities against the Mexican President.

«A corps of the French army landed at Vera Cruz under the command of General Forey. The expedition began with a repulse at Puebla, which served to stimulate the patriotism of its citizens to a resistance which lasted more than a year, but finally, on May 18th, 1863, Puebla capitulated, Juarez fled to the north, where he tried to organize a new resistance, and on June 3rd the French troops made their triumphant entry into Mexico.

«General Forey, having fallen ill, had delivered the command of his troops to Bazaine, who thereupon convoked a Constituent Assembly which decreed that thereafter Mexico should be a Constitutional Empire, the crown being offered to the candidate of Napoleon, the Archduke Maximilian. The newly elected Emperor hesitated to assume the post which had been offered him, foreseeing apparently the tragic destiny which it reserved for him. And only after a plebiscite, made though it was under pressure of the French army, gave valid-

ity to his problematic elevation to the throne, did he finally decide to accept.

«The rest is familiar history. No sooner had he landed at Vera Cruz in May 1864 than he saw his error; instead of a sovereign, he found he was nothing more than the head of a political faction, a simples Miramon. Juarez was master of the interior country, and by means of constant guerrilla warfare he scattered the adherents of the new regime. Maximilian could not subsist without the uninterrupted support of Napoleon's forces, and his common sense showed him his constant peril. Unfortunately, imprudent counsellors exercised too great an influence over his spirit, and led him to resolve to go on with his perilous mission to the end.»

Well might the illustrious French writer have wished to terminate his exceedingly partisan narrative at this point, but his sense of historical justice seems to have outweighed in his conscience the patriotic pleadings of his heart, and he did not resist making this final confession: «It is true that, during this period, the Washington Government showed clearly its keen regret at not being able to offer resistance, except by diplomatic protest, to the events which were transpiring in Mexico, and which constituted so humiliating a reply from Europe to the message of 1823. But it is only proper to render justice to the United States by stating that, even in the midst of their Civil War, and notwithstanding the embarrassments which the war caused, not for one instant was their program renounced, nor their principles abandoned.

«To the invitation of the powers to join them and force Mexico to pay, her debts, the United States replied by offering pecuniary assistance to the Government of Juarez. To the French invasion they opposed a formal and energetic protest. To the election of Maximilian they replied refusing to recognize its fragile royalty. Meantime the struggle con-

tinued between the partizans of Maximilian and those of Juarez. Once the young Emperor had decided to conquer by armed force the crown which he had so longingly desired to receive as the unanimous choice of the people, he threw himself into the strife with real fury. In an evil hour he accepted the counsels of those who suggested that he put an end to the resistance of his adversaries by spreading terror in their midst, and issued the famous decree which forbade his troops to take prisoners, as a result of which fatal order two of the republican chieftans, Artaga and Salezar, were soon afterward executed.

«The indignation provoked by these executions was intense both in Europe and in America. The United States, which had just acquired anew the right to make its voice heard, through the cessation of its Civil War, took advantage of the opportunity to invite the French Government to withdraw its troops from Mexico. The Washington Cabinet placed before the Emperor Napoleon the dilemma, which was described by more than one speaker in Congress in the celebrated cry: «Withdraw or Fight» ! The impression produced was that any further prolongation of French occupancy would imply a declaration of war from the United States. Would it be prudent for the Emperor of France to embark upon a new venture ? Would it be an act of wisdom to mobilize large naval forces and send across the ocean new contingents from the army ?

«Following upon the futility of an understanding with Austria there had come both a new alliance with Italy and diplomatic courtesies with Prussia. Napoleon no longer had the same interest of three years before in making sacrifices to conserve the crown of Mexico upon the head of an Archduke of Austria. In vain, therefore, the unhappy Maximilian sent the Empress Charlotte to Europe to plead for support with the French sovereign and other monarchs. The Imperial

troops were withdrawn from Mexico, while at the same time Napoleon sought to win the good-will of the United States in favor of Maximilian, by permitting Nicaragua to declare null and void the concession granted to the Frenchman Bally for the construction of an inter-oceanic canal, and also to renounce the treaty by which the policing of the same canal had been granted to France.

«All this proved to be in vain. The American Government continued firm in its hostility to the new Mexican Empire. Its end was inevitable, and Maximilian, abandoned to himself, was taken prisoner in Queretand, and executed on June 19th, 1867. The Monroe Doctrine had triumphed !»

In truth the tragedy, in which the unhappy Austrian Archduke had been the chief actor, must have profoundly impressed the old dynasties of Europe. The fall of the Mexican throne did not raise the United States again to its feet, in order to impose upon all the free republics of America its arrogant superiority, as the French writer whom we have so largely quoted would have his readers believe; on the contrary, all the nations of the continent could thereafter be better assured of their autonomy, because of this gracious doctrine, under whose protecting wings, from the very cradle of their political institutions, they could nourish their nascent liberties.

And as to Mexico, to-day as formerly, the attitude of American politics can not fail to be that of constant and cautious vigilance over her destinies. Once each distracted by most cruel civil discord, exposed to all sorts of public calamity, she constitutes a neighbor whose destiny must of necessity closely affect the Fatherland of Washington. *The American Peril*, which so keenly worries Europe, is no less troublesome to the old world than *The Yellow Peril* of Japan to the Americans, and even though the political integrity of the Mexican nation must always be sacred to the United

States, still the right can not be denied her of trying to always have in Mexico friendly administrations, the right to be always on guard lest the hidden enemy which has already endeavored to slyly implant itself in her own midst, be not allowed to establish in neighboring territory a powerful base of military operations.

CHAPTER IV

The World Phase

As has been seen in former chapters, the French writer Barral pictures the United States as striving, during the *invasion period* of its imperialism, to extend its frontiers and assure its continental stability in such a way as to rise to the level of the great powers of Europe; in the *aggressive phase* he describes the States as striving to lay hands by brute force upon Cuba, Porto Rico and the neighboring islands, and thus become rulers once for all of the American Mediterranean, and of the future road to the Pacific; in order that finally, in the *world phase*, they might extend their conquests to other parts of the globe and assume the ostensible tutelage of all the other peoples of the two Americas.

Indeed, from the time that the North Americans, at the beginning of the last century, bought Luiziana from France, and later on acquired Florida, thus extending their territory to the Antilles and the Caribbean Sea, the far-seeing eyes of Jefferson had perceived the future position of his country in relation to the nations of the Old World, and

in a letter written to Monroe in 1823 he penned these words: «We have very few possibilities of collision with Europe, and these can with prudence be adjusted. As to the sister nations of the continent, no one of them is yet at an age to go to war with us, and the European possessions in the two Americas are gradually emancipating themselves, so that we shall soon be freed from bad neighbors. Only Cuba will remain, and she offers but little danger. If, however, England take possession of her, it would be a great calamity. So, if it were possible for us to guarantee her autonomy as regards all other nations except Spain, she would become as if she were our own.»

To those words Adams added the following: «There are laws of political gravitation, similar to those of physical gravitation; and, just as an apple, loosened from the tree by a tempest, falls inevitably to the ground because of the law of gravitation, so Cuba, once shaken loose from Spain, will be incapable of maintaining itself, and will gravitate necessarily to the North American Union, which according to the same law of nature will not be able to repel it.»

At that time the North American government tried in vain to buy from the Spaniards this «Pearl of the Antilles», but as the latter saw their vast possessions in America daily diminishing by the formation of the new Spanish American republics, they refused the most tempting offers of this kind, while indeed behind the scenes at the Court of Madrid other and varied ambitions were being voraciously set in motion for hidden purposes.

Convinced of the futility of thus being able to satisfy their desires, North American statesmen then began efforts to prevent Cuba from passing into stronger hands than those of her primitive colonizers. They formally refused the joint proposal of Great Britain and France, that they three establish a protectorate over the much sought-for prey, in order naturally to later on divide it up amongst themselves

in equal parts. They urged again upon the Spanish Court their offer of one hundred and twenty million francs for the island, and after another solemn refusal, then began to use the time honored process of Britannic imperialism, that of getting possession little by little of Cuban markets, with a view to encourage the revolutionary instincts of the native people against the mother country.

The results of this tenacious and systematic propaganda were magnificent. In 1845, to make use of the caustic phrase of Benoit, «Cuba was already dependent upon American capital». The first symptoms of a struggle for autonomy, which had been easily suppressed in 1835, became more strongly accentuated in 1860, when the revolutionary movement was openly and decisively undertaken by Calixto Garcia, Maximo Gomes and Antonio Maceo. The sinews of war, as represented by the allmighty dollar, were never lacking thereafter to the insurrectionists, and the cause of *Cuba Libre* began to provoke from day to day and even from hour to hour the most vivid sympathy in North American public opinion, which doubtless had been at first against the campaign for separation from Spain, because at that time British influence still weighed heavily in the destinies of Cuba, and in view of the imminence of its passing from the possession of Spain to that of Great Britain, it was felt to be preferable that it should remain under the dominion of Castillians who, much the same as their brethren, the Portuguese, were always recognized as a people of *Conquerors* easily *conquered*.

In 1868, however, when the Ten Year War broke out, North American preponderance was already established over the most beautiful of all the Antilles. Neither France, which, be it said in passing, never had been a good colonizer, nor England, which had not as yet encountered in Germany its dangerous rival of today, could longer make a respectable showing in competition, notwithstanding the important

colonial establishments maintained by each in neighboring islands. And if some day the government of Madrid should lose its outpost in Havana, and Cuba should not be able to govern itself, what could hinder the apple of Adams from eventually falling into North American territory? And, as between the two dominations, why should not Cuba choose the self-government offered by the White House to the atrophying centralization of the Spanish monarchy?

Indeed, the brutal and cruel repression, exercised by the Spaniards against the chimerical revolutionary movements of the island, had created a most profound hatred between the natives and their oppressors. The revolution of 1868 had broken out with unexpected violence; from many cities of the United States powerful aid began to come to the insurrectionary bands, and filibustering expeditions were openly organized on American soil. The federal and the state governments closed their eyes to this abnormal state of affairs, and in Congress motions of sympathy with the Cubans in arms were passed by both houses, while in the very Presidential messages phrases appeared which did not even feign to hide the pronounced sentiments of both people and authorities favorable to the struggling insurrectionists.

The Madrid Foreign Office simulated satisfaction with the formal refusal on the part of the White House to recognize the belligerency of the Cubans, although tacitly their belligerency had been more than recognized, for revolutionary expeditions never ceased to be organized on American soil till the day of the final defeat of the Cuban troops in 1878.

Spain should have well understood that this victory of her arms was but ephemeral. One year before the final suppression of the insurrection, President Johnson, paraphrasing the prophetic words of Adams, had said that just as the West Indies gravitated naturally towards the Continental States, which would eventually absorb them, so it would be an act of prudence on the part of the North

American people to refrain from attempting any solution of the problem of Cuba, and rather leave it to finally obey those same laws of gravitation.

Furthermore, the bloody vengeance wreaked upon the insurrectionists by the Spanish government, and its natural hatred towards the United States, whose designs it so well recognized, only tended to facilitate the increasing intimacy, so fully justified, between Cubans and North Americans. The summary execution of the members of a filibustering expedition sailing under the stars and stripes, and imprisoned by a Spanish frigate, excited to an extraordinary degree the whole American people, and the Washington Government demanded full satisfaction for the execution of ten cubans and twenty seven North Americans, who had been the victims of this atrocious affair.

Referring to the peace thus re-established in Cuba, the Marquez de Barral, already quoted as favorable to the Spanish people in his judgments, thus expresses himself: «The Treaty of Zangon placed affairs once more on the same place as before the suppressed insurrection. The concessions made by Spain were in fact nothing more nor less than those promised by Canovas del Castillo in 1865, and which Porto Rico had obtained in 1869 without any revolt or commotion of any kind. They amounted, in a word, to self-government under the sovereignty of Spain, full amnesty and a forgetting of all that had recently occurred. But alas, it was also, let us frankly confess it, the same system of semi-concessions inaugurated ten years before, self-government more in appearance than in reality, a blind obstinacy on the part of Spain in refusing to abandon completely its old conception of a colonial regime, which consisted in being unwilling to see in the colonies anything except serfs, to be exploited in such a way as to secure from them the largest possible pecuniary returns. It became therefore not a permanent pacification, but rather an armistice.»

When the Cabinet at Madrid finally resolved to follow a more liberal policy towards its priceless possession, by granting to it such genuine reforms as representation in the royal *Cortes*, local government according to more generous plans, and the final abolition of slavery, it was too late. The revolutionary fever had permeated all social classes upon the island, and revolt against the yoke of the Spanish government began to manifest itself in action. The North American policy continued just the same as it had been for forty years, with no precipitation, but also with no let-up and no hindrance.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the French author quoted above, who so fiercely accuses the governments of Washington in their treatment of Spain, eventually, though unconsciously, justifies these same governments by stating that, identical facts had occurred in the actions of nearly all the nations of the Old World: «Certainly, he exclaims, all the countries of the world have at various times used the same disloyal and insincere methods in getting a foot-hold in the internal disputes of neighbors, over whom they wished to extend their supremacy, or from whom they wished to steal a slice of territory; but no nation, in my opinion, ever acted with such persistent hypocrisy as the North Americans in Cuba.»

«When, for instance, he continues, France lent its supports in the Netherlands to the Patriot Party, whilst England helped the *Stadtholders*, these respective governments granted subsidies to the combating parties, and openly boasted that it was their own officers who, as agents, had organized the struggling groups. When our former monarchy (France) endeavored to destroy in Germany the authority and pre-eminence of the house of Austria, and for this purpose gathered the secondary principalities into the famous leagues, our authorities openly avowed advocacy of the cause, and entered into the struggle as a political entity. When Spain came to the assistance of France, the League, or rather the

Fronde, was no less than the government itself, which took the initiative and treated with the malcontents.

« When Russia withdrew its forces from Poland in order to bring to ruin its royal authority by means of incessant anarchy, it was the government of St. Petersburg which organized the various confederations which were thus established, subsidized them and exercised protectorate over them. All this was as disloyal as the conduct of the Americans towards Spain, but at least it was frank and open !»

And the learned writer then adds: « I well know that, alongside of these exemples, there are others of governments which permit their subjects to act, without however acknowledging solidarity with them. I know that it was on his own private initiative that Schomberg went to Portugal, Beaufort went to Chypre, and the flower of French nobility flew to the succour of Washington and the rebels who fought to liberate New England ^{from} the British yoke. But these individual initiatives were not long in being followed by open action on the part of their respective states. I know that Cecil Rhodes and Jameson were not always supported by the Cabinet of St. James; but military expeditions against the Transvaal and Orange followed closely upon the attempts made by these brave pioneers of British conquest. I know that Bulgaria is spending its time at this moment in encouraging one day, only to abandon on the next day, the struggling insurrectionists of Macedonia; but she has for excuse her inhability to do it any other way, because of the veto power of Russia and Austria, even though she may be burning with impatience to act open and above-board.

« If, nevertheless, examples of dissimulation and duplicity analogous to those of the United States towards Spain are numerous in history, it is my belief that at least in its duration the hypocrisy of the American action in Cuba undoubtedly holds the record.»

A new insurrection broke out in 1896, which was destined to crush once and forever Spanish dominion in the island. Estrada Palma, who had been residing for some years in New York, had been patiently preparing the reaction. A so-called Cuban Delegation, generously favored by North American capitalists and also in secret by the Federal Government, as was believed, had succeeded in arming a fleet of filibustering vessels which had, as a result of several trips, taken a great quantity of arms and ammunition to the Cuban coast. Maceo in turn, at the head of his valiant cavalry, surprised the Spanish troops and completely routed them, while Maximo Gomes, recently returned from San Domingo, organized his legions in the eastern part of the island.

In the face of such grave events the government of Madrid sought in vain, by the presence in Havana of Martinez Campos, to assuage the excitement of the insurrectionists, who continued to grow in boldness, until finally general Weyler was appointed commander-in-chief of the legal troops.

A cry of desperation rose at once in all parts of the island against the atrocities attributed to this celebrated guerrilla chieftan. The agitation against Spain became widespread throughout the United States; in the Senate recognition of the belligerents was at once proposed, and in justification of such an extreme measure the atrocities committed by Weyler were narrated in the most vivid colors. The motion was carried by 64 votes against 6, while at the same time the Lower House passed a similar bill by 263 votes against only sixteen!

Meantime Weyler defeated the troops of Maceo, who heroically perished in battle. But, unfortunately for Spain, this victory exercised but little influence on her behalf. Maximo Gomes was daily drilling his troops and better preparing them for action, while at the same time the American

Foreign Office offered its mediation between the rebels and the home country, which act, however, was taken as an affront by the Madrid Cabinet.

Canovas del Castillo, heir of the traditional high-born spirit of the Castillians, energetically repelled the proposal, and all over Spain an intense excitement prevailed against the United States. President Cleveland, elected by the democratic party, which still preserved its traditional ideals from the time of Independence, hastened to assure his fellow-countrymen that, though he could not prevent their expressions of sympathy with the revolutionists, nor entirely avoid the preparation and departure from the American coast cities of expeditions of succour to the insurrectionists, nevertheless he considered that he ought not to recognize their belligerency, which would not only be inopportune but might bring on an ungracious war between the United States and Spain.

Months later Cleveland was succeeded in the Presidency by McKinley, the triumphal candidate of the Republican party, amongst whose leaders were to be found the most ardent partisans of the revolution in Cuba. Canovas was soon after assassinated, and Marshal Blanco substituted Weyler as Commander-in-chief at Havana. The Cabinet of Madrid, presided over now by the chief of the Liberal Party, organized an autonomous government for the island, at the reiterated request of the Federal Government at Washington. These events, however did not succeed in changing the aspect of the situation, for while McKinley, in his presidential message of December 7, 1897, maintained that it was inopportune to recognize the belligerency of the Cubans, and declared that in view of the reforms decreed by Spain in benefit of the island, it was not the proper occasion as yet for an intervention between the colony and the mother country, the motions in Congress in favor of Cuban Independence were daily multiplying. About this time a letter of the

Spanish Minister at Washington fell into the hands of the insurrectionists and was by them widely divulged; in this letter the Minister attacked in a gross and violent manner the American Government, which at once demanded that, besides dismissal from his post, which was immediately decreed by Madrid, the Minister should also be officially re-proved for his conduct, which demand was in turn peremptorily refused by the Cabinet.


At the same time the United States refused to recall from Havana their Consul, general Lee, who was declared by Spain to be an open advocate of the cause of the revolutionists. Suddenly there came the catastrophe of the Maine, and in consequence the passions of all parties in both countries flamed into uncontrollable fury, and neither the Washington nor the Madrid governments could longer stay the awful torrent towards war.

«Public opinion, writes Ribot, triumphed in fact, and before the technical inquiry regarding the cause of the explosion of the Maine, instituted by Madrid, could be closed, suddenly without any new cause whatever, the United States sent to Spain an *ultimatum*, which was in effect a declaration of war, for it demanded that Spain should aid in succouring the *reconcentrados* in accord with the efforts of the United States, and should meantime proclaim an armistice, during which the Wahington Governement, by intervention, should regulate, on a basis of independence, the permanent situation between Cuba and the metropolis. Such conditions were impossible. Europe looked on amazed; it realized that the United States by such acion would, morally speaking, assume a protectorate over the whole of America; it felt that the spectre of Monroe was hanging over its future, and it tried, at least, to avoid a war that would become highly significant. The powers, therefore, putting the Pope at their head, united in requesting arbitration; the United States feigned with courtesy acceptance of the good offices proffered.

and the whole world began to breathe anew with ease when, suddenly, without any further formality, McKinley delivered his terrible message of april 12, 1898, declaring war with Spain !

«Hostilities were of short duration. The Spanish squadron, after having remained in the vast expanses of the ocean with such great care as to be called the *Phantom Fleet*, permitted itself to be stupidly blockaded in Santiago de Cuba. A few regiments of American infantry and cavalry sufficed to defeat the Spanish troops on the island, and Santiago capitulated on July 17, 1898. Spain could no longer think of continuing in a struggle ridiculously unequal the preliminaries of peace were signed in Paris on august 11, and on december 20th the Treaty of Paris put a final stop to the war. The Spaniards ceded the Philippines Islands to the United States for twenty millions of dollars, and abandoned Porto Rico and Cuba, with no promise on the part of the United States to assume the debt of he latter.

«The truth is that by the annexation of the Asiatic archipelago, as affirmed in the message of december 7th, a new current of imperialism became manifest in the United States, and by the possession of Cuba, North America adopted the idea of *Pan Americanism* as its policy regarding the two Americas.»



CHAPTER V

South American Monroeism

The ultimate result of the Spanish-American war, together with the enormous advantages obtained by the United States through the treaty concluded with the government of Madrid, naturally produced a vivid impression throughout the American continent, and especially among the republics of Spanish origin.

The public press of England, and of France, also did much toward the excitement of passions and ill will which became evident in Latin-America on all sides. Economists, statesmen, and writers, of every sort, systematically emphasized this giant step taken by the yankee mammoth in its policy of absorption and enslavement of all of the other weaker peoples of America. Among the many publications which were circulated broadcast during that epoch, none caused more sensation than a pamphlet, edited in London, which enjoyed an extensive circulation among all of the nations of the New-World.

This pamphlet was entitled *South American Monroeism*, and, notwithstanding the fact that it did not bear its author's name, its origin was not infrequently attributed to a nota-

ble South American diplomat who served many years at the various capitals of Europe. However, what made this pamphlet really interesting and worthy of meditation, was the fact that, unlike similar documents distributed, it was not limited to the formulation of the simple accusation that the United States was betraying the Monroe Doctrine by the application of its imperialistic policy, but, in addition thereto, while expanding the ancient and utopian dreams of Bolivar, it suggested a plan for the salvation of the independence and autonomy of the Latin peoples of the continent, which independence it considered to be in imminent danger.

Citing the prophetic words of Cecil Rhodes who said that the Anglo-Saxons are under a sacred obligation to civilize that part of the world which is not yet in a state of civilization, in which connection he specifically mentioned South America, the author of this curious pamphlet, dated London 1903, expressed himself as follows:

«Eighty years ago, Monroe proclaimed *America for the Americans*. Recently, the presidents of the United States have amplified this principle, considering the two Americas for the North Americans.»

For this very reason, Cleveland by the application of this doctrine greatly incommoded the British Government in connection with the boundaries of the Guianas; Mc. Kinley, using the same formula, forced the Spanish flag to abandon the last stronghold of its vast Empire in the New-World. All of the republics south of Panama are enslaved with debts due to foreign creditors. The Americans installed themselves in the Philippines. With the consent of the United States, European war vessels blockaded the ports and waters of Venezuela; they sauntered forth forcibly to collect private debts, and, when not immediately satisfied in their demands, they bombarded ports which were little more than unfortified. While the whole world bore witness to such a situa-

tion, ten South American republics, composed of forty million people accustomed to the handling of arms and possessing the richest territory on the face of the globe, were mere spectators, simply observing the agony of their sister republic whilst they said: «That is no affair of ours»; and a lover of justice (the author), who labored during thirty years in those admirable regions and who perceives South America as being geographically in position to constitute an inexpugnable stronghold for Latin humanity, must say to you: «That is very much your affair». And for your enlightenment, Brazilians, Argentines, Chileans, Uruguayans, Paraguayans, Bolivians, Peruvians, Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Venezuelans, I offer you the following chapters, written and published now nearly two years, before the Anglo-Teuto-Saxon Empire began to civilize Latin-American with its Monroe Doctrines and formulae of Cecil Rhodes and the Draconian laws; and I speak to you from the bottom of my heart.»

The author of *South American Monroeism* then proceeds to unfold his vast policy and plans for the defence of this southern portion of the continent. He shows that, in order to embarrass the Anglo-Saxon imperialism, the ten South American countries should unite in one Southern Empire which would form a real confederation as strong as inexpugnable. He laments the absence of a leader with sufficient prestige to accomplish such a union, but, he says, while in South America we cannot find a Monroe, we find ten fractions where unity is most surely needed.

In reality, there exist nearly forty million individuals — Argentines, Bolivians, Brazilians, Chileans, Colombians, Ecuadorians, Paraguayans, Peruvians, Uruguayans, and Venezuelans — with kindred institutions, customs, races, and languages, all entirely different from those of the Anglo-Saxons or North-Americans, forming peoples who, to-day, are conspicuously represented in the family of world-powers.

When these ten nations should gladly unite hands against the common enemy, they are in reality quite separated, in debt to a point of almost insolvency, and weakened by the heavy burden of armament; some of them with corrupt internal administrations, while others are full of arrogance or imbued with several sorts of vanity without foundation. The distinguished writer then adds:

«We find ten secondary nations where only one solid and powerful Government should exist. History is again repeating itself: South America is playing the part of ancient Greece, the United States that of Macedonia. A lack of unity weakened Greece; subdivision is the weak point of South America which has been disabled by its foreign creditors who enslave it. These ten nations are staggering under the burden of excruciating taxes which, for more than a century, have prevented them from accumulating capital with which to insure their independence; hence their weakness. They are in danger and do not appear to realize the fact.»

A distinguished politician, one of Colombia's brightest men, analysing the so-called A. B. C. Treaty (concluded between Brazil, the Argentine Republic and Chile), in his attempt to point out a lack of shrewdness on the part of the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, accuses the latter of having done nothing more than meet the desires of the United States, Great Britain and France by increasing the misunderstanding between the South American nations and by reviving animosities, once extinct, between the weaker peoples of South America and their powerful neighbors (the oppressors of the continent) when, the distinguished Colombian contends, the Brazilian Foreign Minister was laboring under the mistaken impression that he was celebrating a defensive alliance with those countries against the United States. This distinguished citizen of Colombia cited, in support of his

statement, the following words written by the author of the pamphlet *South American Monroeism*:

«For more than forty years, I have daily read the public press which reflects the high policies of the Great World-Powers, and therefrom I collect, by careful and constant study, accurate knowledge of the plans and pretensions of their governments. Thus, I have come to the conclusion that — the Great Powers being five or six in number as compared with forty or fifty of the smaller nations — the weaker peoples should be ever alert to the combined actions and projects of the stronger. Whenever the Great Powers approach each other for the purpose of a mutual understanding, the weaker nations are always the subject of such conferences.»

«To keep the weaker peoples antagonistic to each other, support one to-day, promise to help another to-morrow, keep them all, and always, in a dependent situation, and to foment rivalry among them, is unfailingly a capital point of the program and policy of the Great Powers; to keep them indebted to the very verge of bankruptcy, to enslave them with foreign debt, is the greatest aim of the powerful Governments of the present day. The great nations induce the weaker ones by indirect means to exhaust themselves by excessive armament, and lead them to enter into treaties of reciprocity wherein are deceitfully hidden the shackles which bind them to submission!»

The distinguished writer then enters upon the decisive portion of his argument with a view to demonstrating the necessity and the urgency of a great *South American Confederation*.

«When Monroe, proclaiming his famous doctrine lost no time in acquiring for his country the Spanish colonies of Florida and in supporting the independence of all of the Spanish Vice-Kingdom in South America, it certainly, was not his purpose that the Vice-Kingdom should be transform-

ed into a great Republic of the United States of South America founded on the lines of the North American Republic. Undoubtedly, his hope was for the formation of seven or more republics of little importance, badly constituted, and destined to be split up from time to time as, in fact, has been the case, struggling with internal strife and war».

«It was also during the time of Monroe that Brazil was emancipated; it was he who recognized the independence of our Empire. The existence of a great Monarchy among the seven republics established, would probably coincide with the plans of the yankee president for the formation of several separate republics instead of one great nation and thus prepare an excellent field for misunderstandings and separations, as has been verified, for no other part of the globe has witnessed so many wars as have occurred in South America.»

«In reality, were it not for so many and fierce struggles resulting from the separation of one from the other, the great South American Republic might readily have been constituted and, at the present moment, would probably have been more important than the United States. One hundred and twenty years ago, the United States was merely a small colony with less than two million inhabitants, and to-day, they possess more than seventy million souls of strong races which place that country on a parity with the Great World-Powers.»

«In 1830, Colombia, which was then the greatest South American country, except Brazil, and occupied the richest portion of the Andes, including the Isthmus of Panama, was split up into three smaller republics forming Venezuela, Ecuador, and the United States of Colombia; and this division was immediately accepted with pleasure by the Yankee Government which, once more, gained another victory in its policy of *subdividing in order to dominate*.»

«These facts taken into consideration in connection with the present Cuban situation and the acquisition of the Philippines, clearly demonstrates the interpretation Mc. Kinley gave the Monroe Doctrine; and nobody in South America should believe that president Roosevelt interprets it in any other manner. The Doctrine will continue to be as follows: *The two Americas for the North-Americans.*

«Therefore, as becomes quite evident, the *Imperial North American Republic* pretends to extend its dominion from pole to pole and from ocean to ocean on the continent, the ten other republics and the three Guianas will forcibly be absorbed or they will be obliged to rectify the Monroe Doctrine, proclaiming: *North America for the North-Americans and South America for us.*

«The present political situation and the imperialistic policy of the United States are thus indicating the urgent necessity of a *Southern Empire* joining the ten existing republics in one *Confederation* in which each should maintain its independence in so far as concerns its laws and institutions, but in which all should constitute a single body to promote their common interests. The ten republics united would in no manner offend the ideals of Washington and his glorious companions, if they would only substitute the Monroe Doctrine for the following: *South America for the South Americans, and our frontier shall be Panama.*

These ideas did not fail to produce a certain number of proselytes in many of the countries on our continent, even in Brazil, where, fortunately, campaigns of hostility toward the United States have not always met with favor in the public opinion. An attempt was made to convert these ideas into facts by the propaganda in favor of a South American Congress on the lines idealized by Bolivar, but restricted to the republics of Latin origin, upon the occasion when it appeared to many that a North-American, Mr. Archibald C. Coolidge of

Harvard University, at Cambridge, Massachusetts, was the first to recognize and proclaim in his book *The United States A World-Power*, the danger the weaker republics of South America were subject to in view of the expansionist policy of late adopted by the Government of his country. In speaking of the relations between the United States and Latin-America, the distinguished Yankee writer expressed himself as follows:

«The greatest obstacle to approximation is the lack of political confidence on the part of the Latin-Americans toward their neighbors of the north, a lack of confidence which Europe is ever ready to promote to the best of its ability. This lack of confidence is not entirely without foundation: not to mention the many irresponsible people who write to the effect that the destiny of the United States is to dominate the Western World, and not, for a single moment, doubting the sincerity of the American people and the Government at Washington when they seek the friendship of the Latin-American republics, there still remains some ground for distrust. History proves to us that when powerful and weak States become intimately associated, the independence of the weaker always runs some risk. During our time, the United States is in a position analogous to that of Prussia in relation to the other Zollverein nations; possesses a greater population, a more considerable natural richness and better developed resources. In fact, it is not only stronger than the American republics, one for the other, but even stronger than all of these republics together».

«We must confess, on the other hand, that the history of the progress made by the United States is not entirely tranquillizing. For this reason, the Latin-Americans are always willing to court suspicion at the slightest action on the part of the United States and to frown at anything which, directly or indirectly, might appear to be an affront. Incidents which in the United States have not attracted attention but for a single moment, imprudent words to which not

even the slightest importance has been attached, all together, repeated and magnified, may readily create in the Latin republics a resentment fatal to all good relations».

«The American statesmen who have endeavored to promote better relations between the countries of the New-World, fully realize these difficulties and know that the Government at Washington should, above all, exert every effort to convince the sister republics that they have nothing to fear from their powerful neighbor. This was one of the motives of Secretary of State Root's visit in 1906. In his address at Rio de Janeiro, he declared with as much tact as energy:

«We consider the independence and the rights of the weaker members of the family of nations quite as worthy of respect as those of the greatest Empire, and we see in this respect the principal guarantee of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We do not pretend to aspire to any right, to any privilege, to any power, to which we do not equally recognize the right of any one of the South American republics».

«On the other hand, Latin-Americans of considerable culture find much to admire and emulate in the history, the institutions, and in the character of North-Americans; they admit a debt of gratitude toward the United States which, in times gone by, protected their countries, and whose Government does not maintain for them other than the most excellent intentions. They begin to feel themselves capable of defending themselves against Europe and they do not fear European attacks as much as the supremacy of North America. In connection with their dignity, they are very susceptible, and, as nations, they desire to be treated on a footing of equality with the others. The most notable result of the recent Hague Conference is probably the new situation

occupied by the South American Republics. They were not the obedient followers of the United States: they assumed an independent attitude which, upon certain occasions, placed them in complete opposition to the Anglo-Saxon republic and probably in detriment of the Pan-American cause».

Mr. Coolidge then goes on to demonstrate how the most exalted of the politicians of the Latin republics began to set the *Pan-Iberianism* against the *Pan-Americanism* of the United States, going so far, in 1904, as to promote a congress in Madrid to deal with this grave problem. He considers as entirely just the enthusiasm which such an idea created in certain countries such as Mexico and Chile. He recalls the good impression caused by the attitude assumed by the Government of the White House in connection with the conflict between Guatemala and Venezuela which was rapidly liquidated by the annexation of Porto Rico, the successive interventions in Cuba to guarantee public liberty, and the treaty concluded in San Domingo which assumed manifestly the commencement of a protectorate.

The distinguished and illustrious writer confesses that later, as an epilogue, there appeared the question of the Panamá Canal which increased the distrust rampant on the rest of the continent against the United States. And this distrust increased even more when the United States refused to accept the Drago Doctrine recently adopted by the other republics of the New-World, a doctrine according to which the international code should prohibit all States from the collection of debts by force.

The eminent professor and writer then passes on to consider the relations between the Anglo-Saxon republic and those of Latin-America, taking into consideration the perspective of a future more or less remote. In his opinion, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, in view of their distance from American ports, and their geographical situation, have nothing to fear from the United States, and

especially if they know how to conduct their administrations with prudence, honesty, and wisdom. Paraguay and Bolivia, without sea-coasts, will, in all probability, never have intimate relations with the United States and its policy. The same will not be the case, exclaims Coolidge, with the more northerly republics of South America, Central America and the islands of Haiti and San Domingos. All of these countries, more or less extensive in area and sparsely populated, constantly threaten to create the most grave difficulties for North American interests. North-Americans entered into much more intimate contact with these countries after they established themselves in the waters of the Caribbean Sea, and this proximity will become more disagreeable once the Panamá Canal is in definite operation. In none of these countries is the Government sufficiently stable to guarantee order and legality. With respect to some of them, it might well be said, at the present moment, that they will live in continual financial conflicts with the European countries whose citizens have extensive capital employed in their territories. Because of this fact, the United States may be called at every moment to exercise over them a policy which, without doubt, will not be agreeable to their people.


From this point of view, Mr. Coolidge frankly analyses the special situation of his country toward Mexico. It is a region in which white men are in the minority and which has attracted but few foreigners. The Yankee colony there numbers less than fifteen thousand persons; almost equal to the Spanish colony. Nevertheless, more than one half of the importation comes from the United States which receives almost three-quarters of Mexico's exportation, while the amount of American capital invested is very great and increases from day to day. Mr. Coolidge says, textually: «This pacific penetration constitutes a possible danger to the very independence of the Mexican Republic.»

He concludes:

«A well consolidated government becomes, for Mexico, as well as for every Latin-American republic, absolutely indispensable unless they wish to find themselves in grave difficulties. The more they become conscious of their responsibilities, the greater the respect they will receive from the world, and they will thus guard against intrusion from abroad. Aside from this, they have at their disposal a means of defence which nobody can deny them: *they can associate themselves in more considerable groups*. Consolidated in this manner, they could deal with the United States as equal to equal with much better success than they can to-day, and, far from condemning such a form of association, public opinion in the United States would consider it perfectly reasonable because we do not propose to set one American country against another nor to intimidate any of them by a show of our accumulated force. We are too conscious of the superiority of the United States to stoop to such ideas. If, for example, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay were to unite with Argentine Republic; if the former United States of Colombia were to be reestablished including, as formerly, Venezuela and Ecuador, and probably even Peru; if the Republics of Central America could succeed in forming a lasting federation, and if Mexico might, perhaps, be added, Latin-America would be composed of only a few great States, each one of which would be sufficiently important to claim the right to a splendid place in the modern world and would not fear aggression from any foreign nation. The proof that Latin-Americans are backward in a political sense — and this is but an unfortunate hereditary trait of Spanish temperament — lies in the fact that with so many common points, the same language, the same colonization, the same essential

interests, they persist in maintaining political subdivisions which are due to mere accidents in their history.»

It would be impossible to produce a more sincere panegyric of the ideas set forth, years ago, by the illustrious champion of SOUTH AMERICAN MONRGEISM.



CHAPTER VI

Brazil and the United States

If, in reality, the political situation of the United States, in view of the concert of the Great World-Powers, is such as we have emphatically demonstrated it to be; if, on a par with its pressing necessities of an international nature, it is its very instinct of conservation which has frequently impelled its Governments to maintain toward Mexico a conduct which more than once has provoked serious irritations and protests on our continent and abroad, this does not signify that we should invariably form alongside the United States as a decided and dedicated body-guard as a consequence of the constant friendship and moral alliance which, during nearly a century, has linked us throughout the evolution of the New-World, when we, directly or indirectly, do not consider our destiny or the dearest and real American interests to be at stake.

What we cannot and should not do, however, is to place ourselves in a hostile position toward that friendly Republic, without due and reflected examination of the circumstances, or enlist ourselves in the ranks of those who systematically oppose the United States with every sort of weapon and by all available means.

g. turned out to be.

The only demonstration which would be patriotically admissible on our part, would be to give expression to our deep regret, or surprise, upon every occasion in which it appears to us that its statesmen follow an erroneous path, formulating, upon such occasions, our votes for a change of policy and direction, as, at the present moment, we regret to say, is happening in the case of President Wilson, who, in the presence of the European conflict, unfortunately does not appear to comprehend the historical moment which the universe is witnessing and who is playing a part which, without doubt, will not place him on a parity with the great statesmen who, from Washington to Cleveland, with few exceptions, so competently distinguished and strengthened their Nation, which may be likely to suffer to-morrow such bitter privations as never once it has experienced, for a single moment, in connection with its glorious existence as a free, independent and powerful people.

As a matter of reciprocal security and common political necessities, Brazil and the United States cannot fail ever to proceed united on the continent, as, likewise, the true course we should follow in view of European policy is ever increasingly to foster approximation toward Germany, which, aside from being our best friend and most cultured of the European countries, is the one which best serves our economic and social interests.

With respect to the United States, when, in 1913, I had the honor to greet Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, during his sojourn in this city, I said:

«However it may be, one thing is certain, and that is: As Brazil and the United States are the only nations of the continent which have not the same ethnic origin and whose people do not speak a common language, it behooves them increasingly to cherish this natural and spontaneous alliance which for nearly a century has been morally bidding them together as sister-nations, the

two greatest Powers of the New-World, and consequently the chief heralds, which they must never cease to be, of peace, order, and political liberties of America.»

President Rodrigues Alves, in one of his first messages upon the occasions of the opening of the National Congress, wrote as follows:

«I observe with great satisfaction that the relations of cordial friendship between Brazil and the United States tend to become stronger. In promoting this result, I have done nothing more than to follow the policy laid down since 1822 by the founders of our independence, invariably observed by every one of the Brazilian Governments».

Rio Branco, in a memorable monograph, published by the «Revista Americana» immediately after his death, set forth a historical resumé of all the acts and documents which gradually solidified this policy of approximation to such an extent as to transform it, without the necessity of a treaty, into a perfect alliance for the defence of the highest and most sacred destiny of the two Americas.

Our immortal patriot demonstrated that, even prior to the Independence and the establishment of the Empire, acting under the counsel of José Bonifácio, who prepared the proclamation of August 6, 1822, in which he alluded to the necessity which behooved Brazil and the other nations to maintain diplomatic representatives who should mutually represent them, Dom Pedro I accredited a plenipotentiary near the Government at Washington. Rio Branco thus called attention to the fact that the United States was the first country to recognize the Empire, in contradiction of the erroneous statement made by Eduardo Prado in his «União Americana».

Rio Branco likewise referred to the fact that, two months after the publication of the «yankee» President's message of

December 8, 1823, formulating the so-called Monroe Doctrine, Brazil announced its approval thereof, preceding the other countries of the continent in this connection.

Instructions given by Carvalho de Mello, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires at Washington, provided that he should sound the disposition of the Department of State in connection with the possibility of an «offensive and defensive alliance with the Empire as a part of the American continent». Three years later, the Marquis de Aracaty, then in charge of Brazil's foreign relations, continued to recommend that the Brazilian plenipotentiary to the great Republic should «endeavor to prove to that Nation that His Majesty the Emperor, in his high and wise policy, well knew the value of that Nation and realized that it would be of common interest to both countries if their Governments would make a special feature of improving their political relations by each lending a helping hand to the other».

At that time, Rio Branco was quoting the words of Pereira Pinto, when, in 1865, he affirmed that: «the relations of firm alliance thus consolidated with the United States have continued in a state of perfect cordiality, unaltered by slight incidents or conflicts at different times». He enumerated all of the international incidents which have occurred and which were always settled brilliantly for our country; the American Government always severely punishing its agents who, among us, failed to conduct themselves with proper esteem, dignity and courtesy, extending to us, always, the most complete explanations. He dragged forth from oblivion excerpts from a work in which that eminent internationalist, commending the desire of the United States to accomplish a more intimate alliance with Brazil, stated that: «if such had been accomplished, the unqualifiable interference of Spain and France in the affairs of Mexico and Peru, as well as the insults which the powerful nations of Europe thrust upon the weak peoples of the New-World, would, perhaps, have been avoided».

He cited, as a complement, the memorable words of Tavares Bastos when he affirmed: «if we aim to equal Europe, we should begin by fostering approximation toward the United States», because he was convinced that, even from a political viewpoint, relations with the great Republic were those most beneficial to Brazil. Finally, after having demonstrated that Pedro II and the greatest statesmen of the second reign were always ardent adepts of these same ideas, he concluded enumerating the solid proofs of friendship and esteem always given Brazilians: causing the French to evacuate Amapá in 1836 and avoiding its conquest quite recently, in 1895, by an expedition organized by Messrs. Hanno-teaux and Lebon as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Colonial Minister; arranging that our country furnish an arbiter in 1872 for the Tribunal of Geneva which resolved the serious question of the Alabama; conferring upon the Brazilian plenipotentiary the Chairmanship of the Franco-American Arbitral Tribunal in 1880; by not permitting, during the War of the Secession, the suggestion of any mediator who be not one of our representatives; in conclusion, by not permitting that Brazilian sovereignty be in the slightest manner offended during the crisis of the Acre question, and by not paying the slightest attention to intrigue which, around the White House, more than once, has endeavored to chill the secular friendship which, without interruption, has joined the two greatest republics of the continent ever since 1822 up to the present day.

Rio Branco, himself, above all others comprehended the development of this friendship on the most solid foundations, through the incomparable spirit of Joaquim Nabuco, who, incontestably, consolidated it by a series of diplomatic achievements which, to a greater measure than our national gratitude, commend him to the eternal recognition of all of the South American peoples who always found in him an

apostle, an invincible defensor, of their liberties during the most grave and brilliant international controversies

During the Empire and the Republic, Brazil's noble, lofty, and sound policy toward the United States has been incessant, while we never ceased most highly esteem the good friendship of and to promote amicable relations with all of the other countries of the continent. This policy has never once been deviated from during all of the phases of our national evolution. On the verge of the tomb, our greatest diplomat, found himself immortalized in History as a consequence of having assured the confraternity of the American peoples by the exercise of energy, foresight, and courage.

Therefore, to derogate this traditional policy, at the present moment, when it is the only stronghold which remains intact in the midst of the anarchy which chastizes the country, or to plan a new policy, based upon mere vanity or doctrinary enthusiasm, renouncing a past full of glory, would mean mortally to wound our Brazilian nationality because this great work, triumphally terminated by the second Rio Branco who had the good fortune thus to consolidate it, does not represent merely the action of a genius but the result of the efforts of two generations of illustrious statesmen, who, during long periods of the Empire wisely, fostering continental peace and the cohesion of the Nation, prepared a brilliant future of ever-increasing prosperity for the Republic.

CONTENTS

	Pages.
Introduction	5
Chapter I — The Monroe Doctrine and the American Peril.. . . .	11
Chapter II — The economic imperialism of the United States	17
Chapter III — Political and moral imperialism in the United States	27
Chapter IV — The World Phase.	41
Chapter V — South American Monroeism.	53
Chapter VI — Brazil and the United States	76

RETURN TO the circulation desk of any
University of California Library
or to the

NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
Bldg. 400, Richmond Field Station
University of California
Richmond, CA 94804-4698

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS
2-month loans may be renewed by calling
(510) 642-6753

1-year loans may be recharged by bringing books
to NRLF

Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days
prior to due date

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

OCT 22 1993

U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



C020848343

14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT.

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or
on the date to which renewed.
Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

8 May '63 MF	REC'D LD
REC'D LD MAY 6 1963	JAN 18 '65 - 6 PM
16 May '63 MF	5 May '65 J D LD
REC'D LD	JUN 5 1965
NOV 4 '63 - 9 AM	REC'D LD
23 Nov '63 SM	MAY 12 '65 - 1 PM
REC'D LD	
NOV 9 '63 - 11 AM	NOV 24 1989
22 Oct '64 6B	ED 27 1965
IN STACKS	REC. CIR. JAN 08 '90
OCT 8 1964	

LD 21A-50m-11,'62
(D3279s10)476B

General Library
University of California
Berkeley

